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Abstract: 
The objective of this study is to review the manner in which oral histories address the ‘problem’ 
of memory, and to use an example from a 2002 oral history project concerning accounting 
partnerships in New Zealand to illustrate aspects of this problem. Many of the interviewees in 
2002 recalled anti-nepotism clauses in accounting partnership deeds and acknowledged these 
clauses had been triggered by an event. There was a diversity of recollection as to the detail of 
this event, and various rationales, justifications, or explanations were provided. Together, these 
suggested anti-nepotism clauses retained considerable traction in partnership deeds without a 
shared understanding of their cause. This led to the question: why should the memory of a 
significant event be lacking when the consequences of the event remained structurally embedded? 
It is suggested that the traction of such anti-nepotism rules continue, because the underlying 
principle resonates with archetypal partnership codes. 
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“His mind had not preserved memories like fossils forever embedded in their original 
form, inanimately awaiting excavation; on the contrary, the very act of revisiting these 
sites had sufficed to scatter these ‘artifacts’ into more recent layers of living memory and 
imagination, thereby transforming them”
i
. 
 
Introduction 
Schoolcraft calls this transformation a ‘mutilated reality’ and yet these memories provide frames 
of memory which work together in the construction of self. In a profession, these frames assist 
individuals to make sense of the profession and its values. One objective of this study is to review 
the manner in which oral histories address the ‘problem’ of memory. Early on in the development 
of the discipline of oral history there were some particularly insightful reviews and commentaries 
on this issue (such as Portelli, 1981
ii
), which may have calmed some of the more vociferous 
opponents of oral histories as data. Yet accuracy in recollections still presents a challenge in oral 
history analysis.  
In reviewing the manner in which memory functions, Schoolcraft
iii
 reminds us that in utilising 
memories of the ‘Occupation’ years during periods of war; meetings, names and chronology took 
an importance that they would not otherwise have initially possessed. The passing of time did not 
relax the grip and recall of these memories. In addition, makeshift situations experienced at these 
times destabilise the memory or disrupted processes. At such time, the memory loses its ‘fixed 
backdrop’, and compared with other more stable periods, recall is increased.  
Given the context of the moment of recall, and the selective processes of remembering, those 
undertaking oral histories have to consider how to address such an issue. A major contribution 
can be found in Thompson’s (1978) chapter on “Evidence’
iv
 in which he highlights the special 
value interviews possess, as subjective spoken testimony. It is inevitable that different individuals 
recall different perspectives from a shared or widely communicated event, as will be 
demonstrated in this discussion of anti-nepotism rules in accounting partnerships. More 
‘traditional’ historical resources such as newspapers, correspondence, Minutes of Cabinet 
meetings or Parish Councils, diaries, or even census data and Registers, have been subject to 
assessment in respect of their claimed objectivity or soundness, with many biases or selectivity 
being apparent.  
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The consensus developed by oral historians as to the means of achieving a sufficiently rigorous 
analysis of the interview data is that there must be consistency in multiple recollections of key 
events. In the example provided in this paper there was a diversity of recollection as to a 
particular event. Knowledge of this event gave rise to anti-nepotism rules in some accounting 
partnerships. The evolution of anti-nepotism clauses appears to have led to a sustained acceptance 
of the ‘rightness’ of such principles, while there was only sparse recall of a possible originating 
event. Accordingly this case tests the principle of only using data where there is inter-participant 
consistency. Furthermore, the smoothness of a life-long career in an accounting partnership, and 
the homogeneity of such organisations in this jurisdiction, provided a stable framing to the idea of 
anti-nepotism rules.  
This led the researcher to question: why should the memory of a significant event be lacking 
when the consequences of the event remains structurally embedded? By reviewing recollections 
of the reasons for anti-nepotism clauses in partnerships, an attempt is made to engage this 
question. The significance of this research is that it informs our appreciation of the importance of 
contextual understanding. This paper therefore outlines the research processes, before reviewing 
different stories of the event and its consequences, and the way in which the ‘event’ informs 
current professional accounting partnerships.  
The Unexpectedness of it 
“Narratives can be powerful tool for opening up new areas of inquiry in stabilized and 
well established fields of knowledge…new complementary lines of research may be 
opened”
v
. 
Unexpected outcomes from narratives are of significant value in an oral history. Data for this 
study was derived from a larger project, for which the research question can be broadly stated as 
“why did the survivors survive: reasons for the differential survival of large accounting firms 
from the Big 8
vi
 of the 1980s.” The interviewees were respondents to a survey of members of the 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand who had been partners in major audit firms 
between 1982 and 1992, and who had agreed to be interviewed. Mostly retired partners were 
selected because it was believed they would talk more freely about their experiences. All of New 
Zealand’s large firms were represented, and participants were from both urban and rural practices 
throughout the country. The objective of the interviews was to discuss and review the reasons for 
the survival of the remnant Big 4 firms
vii
, and to discuss factors that had contributed to the 
collapse of other large firms in New Zealand in the 1980s.  
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The interviews were conducted in 2002, and nearly all
viii
 tapes have been deposited in the 
National Oral History Archives. These interviews were unstructured, but they all covered similar 
topics: individual work histories, audit practice, income allocation, international affiliations, and 
particular firm histories. Although the interviews provided valuable insights into the original 
research questions — in particular, the income allocation issue and individual firm histories — 
there were some unexpected revelations during the interviews. There was confusion concerning 
distinctive characteristics between the Big 8, and answers concerning the underlying significance 
of the audit business were divergent (was it primarily to provide a 'backbone’ of steady cash 
flows throughout the annual cycle, or bringing in associated accounting activities). A survey prior 
to the interviews had shown there was widespread concern at the problem of inequitable 
partnership income allocation. But it was the unexpected revelation of the existence of anti-
nepotism rules halfway through the interviews which prompted this study. 
How can Oral Histories evaluate such evidence? As noted by Peneff, to achieve a reading of the 
events with as much representational faithfulness as possible,  
“you have to know how to pick out by experience or intuition the spheres where the 
narrator will show him or herself to be a good source, and where the facts will be fudged; 
both dispositions can be combined in the same individual, since detachment, a sense of 
objectivity, and an aptitude for realism or perception can coexist with blindness to what is 
portrayed, a wish to pass over critical moments of existence, or a tendency to systematic 
misrepresentation”
ix
. 
But conversely, oral historians cannot be all-knowing, and Tonkin warns: “Historians who use the 
recollections of others cannot just scan them for useful facts to pick out, like currants from a cake. 
Any such facts are so embedded in the representation that it directs an interpretation of them, and 
its very ordering, its plotting, and its metaphors bear meaning too”
x
.  
All records of accounting arrangements depend on the experience of the teller and the recorder 
for both the construction and interpretation of the events. Chiefly, oral history rules require that 
the histories have internal consistencies, and seek confirmation in other sources, whilst being 
aware of potential bias of both the narrator and interviewer. Could these rules be applied in 
examining this topic of anti-nepotism?  
With anti-nepotism rules, their somewhat unusual characteristic may have been submerged by 
‘normality’ and the consensus nature shown by senior partners in mentoring the new partner into 
the organisation. The other characteristic of these organisations was that in many cases there was 
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only a ‘token’ deed of partnership and new entrants were not expected to request a copy for 
inspection  
“[Q: Did you ever find [anti-nepotism clauses] in partnership deeds?] No. Those days we 
rarely had deeds. It was all verbal agreements. In fact, it was only much later in the Cook 
& Company … that we ever had a deed, or a partnership agreement. It was all very much 
a handshake-type arrangement, or the common thing that they’d say, ‘on the back of a 
cigarette packet’.” 
“[The senior partner] called me in and he said “Tom, delighted to see you, sit down. We 
had a meeting yesterday and decided to make you a partner from January,” this was 
November, I think it was. I said “Thank you”, he said, “Congratulations, and, you know, 
see me about anything you want,” and that was it. Out the door. [Q: No deed?] No deed, 
Lord, no, we didn't have a partnership deed. You got around to signing those months or 
years later. As to income, as to accounts: no, you didn't see those. If you insisted, and you 
were liable to get a black mark, you would be shown a set of accounts, but you weren't 
allowed to take a copy. It was a very patriarchal”. 
 
There was no discussion of this casual attitude to the formal side of a partnership organisation in 
the few written partnership histories in New Zealand.  
When asked, interviewees provided only a few intuitive reasons for anti-nepotism clauses, with 
no inter-participant consistency, and little certainty, on any detail of the founding incident. As 
will be further discussed, the very lack of consistencies in the understanding of the drivers to the 
original rules demonstrates that once the rules were instituted, they had such traction that the 
rationale became irrelevant. In order to discuss the exact nature of the anti-nepotism rules, the 
next section reviews ideas about the incidence of nepotism, and data from the interviews. 
The phenomenon of nepotism 
Historically, selection or promotion based on consanguinity used to mean the advantages, or 
opportunities for advancement, enjoyed by a Pope’s nephew. However, the meaning enlarged to 
include unfair preferment of - or favouritism shown to - friends, protégés or others within one’s 
personal sphere of influence.  
Adam Bellow identifies that preferred access through family ties or patronage is characteristic of 
certain professions; in particular banking, the military, the church, medicine, and the law
xi
. 
Nepotism, or generational succession, enjoyed resurgence with the well-documented incidence of 
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nepotism in American politics. Back in the 1920s and 1930s nepotism was everywhere, and “far 
from being controversial, it seemed as natural as breathing”
xii
. It was later seen as a strategy for 
class or elite domination, contravening the American ideals of a free society where everyone 
could advance on the basis of merit alone. Therefore, in addition to its occurrence in politics and 
some professions, Bellow suggested systematic nepotism had been practiced by the poor and in 
working classes e.g. firemen, policemen, and builders. It is seen by some as a rational group 
strategy. 
 Bellow does not address the accounting profession, nor whether any professions had anti-
nepotism rules. However, many would agree with the view that “any entitlement to advancement 
on grounds of merit alone, free of any tinge of political nepotism, must be jealously guarded by 
any self-respecting profession”
xiii
. Nepotism is seen as undermining a basic sense of fairness, 
promotes wastes and inefficiencies, and is an obstacle to healthy economic growth; and the anti-
nepotism movement was a middle-class (i.e. professional class) phenomenon,  
Accordingly, this would lead one to predict that anti-nepotism rules would be observed in 
professional partnerships in a variety of jurisdictions. As far as can be ascertained, it does not 
occur in accounting firms outside New Zealand, nor in other professions. This is surprising, given 
Bellow’s analysis of the middle-class origins of anti-nepotism sentiment. 
In this oral history, the first reference to anti-nepotism rules appeared in the 20
th
 out of the 40 
interviews, and the narrator was talking about some other individuals and their involvement in 
local politics; how it assisted in building up business links: 
“Doug Elliffe avoided it all, because his father had been the Elliffe of Hutchison Elliffe & 
Cameron, and in those days they didn’t allow sons of the firm to work for them. Or 
become partners. [Q: Before the Second World War?] It may have related to a specific 
problem that Hutchison Elliffe & Cameron had, but Doug Elliffe, never. He went to work 
for Wilkinson Christmas. Noel Barclay started, or became, Kirk Barclay. I think his 
brother Roy too. But their parents were in Hutchison Elliffe & Cameron. [Q: Do you 
think there’s some benefit in that? Sons not working in the same firm as their father?] 
Well evidently there had been a problem with one of the names in the firm. I think it was 
Hutchison. But I think that there is something in that. But certainly it’s gone the full 
circle. Because Doug Elliffe’s son is one of the senior partners in KPMG now”. 
This comment prompted the question of anti-nepotism rules being raised thereafter in other 
interviews, and responses sought from those already interviewed.  
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Nepotism in Accounting Partnerships 
The most common reasons, provided in interviews for the retention of the anti-nepotism rules 
were  
 Fathers and sons tend to fall out 
 It was necessary to allay suspicions that the son was taking the easy road to the top  
 That the son would be able to rise irrespective of merit 
 Perceived favouritism.  
It was apparent that, firstly, the rules differed among the Big 8 firms by the late 1980s. For 
example, one partner of Wilkinson Wilberfoss (which became Arthur Young) recalled a father 
and son both being partners in his firm in the early 1970s, but the firm had an anti-nepotism rule 
thereafter which precluded a father and son working in the same office in the first partnership 
term of the new partner (the son)
xiv
.  
Barr Burgess & Stewart, predecessor firm of Coopers & Lybrand, also had a rule:  
“The rule was you could not have a son working or a partner in the same office as his 
father. But we did have Bruce Peterson’s son Ross Peterson; became a partner. [Bruce] 
was a partner in Invercargill who then retired, and his son became a partner, finished up 
in Whangarei”. 
Deloitte’s predecessor firms were Hutchison Elliffe & Cameron (already discussed) and Watkins 
Hull Wheeler and Johnston. Watkins Hull Wheeler and Johnston had a policy after 1972 against 
fathers and sons in the same firm. Tom Davies recalled this date was convenient as it was just 
after Bill Parsons, the son of partner Geoff Parsons, became a partner. After that, children of 
partners were not allowed to be employed at all, apart from holiday jobs. One partner did not 
recall precisely why this policy was then introduced into the predecessor firms of Hutchison Hull: 
“I have a dim recollection that there might have been a son in the Auckland Office who 
had aspirations not matched by partners’ assessments of him (his father excepted, of 
course)….A few years later there was a mild “disturbance” when Dunedin Office – for 
which read Jim Valentine, who possibly was also chairman at the time – insisted that his 
son, Murray, be made a partner at the unheard of age of 28. I think Jim was possibly the 
most autocratic senior partner I have ever come across, and to cross him could be 
unpleasant. I suspect we bent the policy to avoid war in the South. Anyway, Murray was 
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perfectly competent, although he wandered off a few years later to become a professional 
director with mixed success”. 
In KPMG and its predecessor firms (Morris Pattrick; and Gilfillan, Gentles, Pickles, and Perkins) 
bucked the trend of anti-nepotism rules, although it was considered valuable for a son to get 
experience in other firms and overseas. Subsequently there was nothing to prevent their joining 
the same firms as their father. Neither did the predecessor firms of Touche Ross (Clarke Menzies 
and McCulloch Butler and Spence) have any specific clause. Price Waterhouse was a small 
franchise arm of the international firm, and Arthur Andersen did not have a presence here until 
late in the 1980s. When asked, an anti-nepotism rule did not occur in the memories of partners of 
the predecessor firms of Ernst & Whinney. 
There were frequent recollections of father and sons both being partners, but in different firms, as 
described with Lawrence Anderson Buddle
xv
: “All the partners in our Christchurch firm had sons 
and many of them qualified as accountants but none of them ever came into the firm”. This had 
not been the case earlier, particularly in local firms.  
“[Q: Buddle & Company
xvi
 sounded like a whole sequence of fathers and sons?] Well it 
was; and I think that was part of the perception that I have had and I’ve read about it 
often, that in business, the first generation makes it, the second generation spends it, and 
the third generation tries to regroup it. With the Buddle firm, I never knew Joseph Forster 
Buddle, but I did know Frederick Charles Buddle who was still alive when I joined the 
firm [c. 1960]. We were at 41 Shortland Street on the second floor, and there was a short 
diagonal walk across the road to the Auckland Club. Fred Buddle would always go to the 
Auckland Club from 12 ‘til 2, have his whiskeys or whatever it was and then came back 
and go to sleep in the stuffed chaise lounge in his son Peter’s office, until 3.30 and then 
go home; and I have a vivid picture of him walking diagonally across the road from 41 
Shortland Street to the Auckland Club. He was an inveterate pipe smoker, and he had 
tapped the dottle of his pipe out into his umbrella and his umbrella was in flames behind 
him as he walked across the road [Laughs]”. 
Two of those interviewed were sons of partners in the firm they joined as a partner. One of them, 
Derek Holland, recalls that the partners other than his father had to persuade his father to allow 
him in as a partner, as the other partners feared losing his skills to their firm. Tom Davies’ father 
had retired the year before he became a partner. Another recalled that when another firm offered a 
partnership to his son “they thought they were getting a treasure, getting my son in the first 
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place…but he didn’t prove to be a particularly good accountant and I think he disappointed them 
a bit”. 
There was also the view that there was a problem if fathers push their sons into the partnership 
when the son is not well suited to the profession. The Auckland firm of Duthie Voyce, one of the 
predecessor firms of Ernst & Whinney, Alan Voyce’s son Kit was in the practice: “he was not 
well-suited to it and probably would rather have been a farmer; he also took a long time to get his 
exams finished. This may have resulted in some antagonism. However he did not survive the 
Ernst & Young merger, although he had continued in Hunt Duthie”. There was also Ernest Hunt’s 
son Bill who was “not a willing accountant; he went to the UK, and then retired when he was 
about 50, which was a bit of a surprise. The job just wasn't suited for him”.  
A further argument for anti-nepotism was the increasing practice of utilising peer review within 
each office as a form of quality control. Peer review relies on relative independence of individuals 
within each office and may have been impacted by family relationships. However, there was no 
consensus on the precise details of the founding incident, as discussed earlier, 
Discussion and Conclusion 
Memory is a social as well as an individual process
xvii
. In the relatively small professional 
community of accountants in New Zealand, these interviews provided an insight into how such a 
community has a conversation with itself about the nature of professional relationships and 
professional identity. Whatever the ambivalence about the detail of the founding event, the anti-
nepotism rule had considerable traction once established as shown by the extent to which 
participants did not seek to determine whether or not there was a just cause for the rule. Although 
anti-nepotism rules were not evident in all partnerships, even those interviewees from firms 
without the rule agreed it ‘made sense’. The subsequent use (or abuse) of the founding event in 
justification of such rules reflects an interplay on the extent to which history provides 
representational faithfulness, or merely a representation. In addition, each individual narrative 
provided in the interviews may have reflected the speaker’s own theoretical suppositions, 
particularly in the question: why not in legal partnerships?  
For example, given the analysis by Adam Bellow of the rise of anti-nepotism in middle-class 
America, it begs the question: why were there no such clauses in other professional partnerships? 
This question prompted inconclusive responses; for example, one partner suggested “because 
law’s all about emotion and the joy of words and things, and accounting is cold, hard clinical 
facts”. Another: “because lawyers are like doctors, they are dynastic. [Q: Why are accountants 
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not so dynastic?] I think it’s because there’s not quite the same mystique…a sort of Druidic 
culture. Once you were initiated into it [the legal profession] you can’t imagine doing anything 
else”
xviii
. 
The messages from the past influence present practice and assist in answering “why the memory 
of a significant event should be lacking when the consequences of the event remains structurally 
embedded”. It is suggested that anti-nepotism rules continue, because they resonate with two of 
the premises underlying partnership organisations: that the members are equal, and each gained 
their position under meritocracy. They are partners, for better or for worse. The trust required in 
the step of becoming a partner was signified by it being considered ‘bad form’ to seek a copy of 
the partnership deed. It is expected that each member leaves the partnership in a better state than 
it was when he or she entered. This working for the greater good means there is a commitment to 
transfers of (intergenerational) wealth outside the usual limits of consanguinity. Any single 
partner wishing to make a case against the anti-nepotism clause would, prima facie, be deemed 
acting in a manner contrary to these principles of these archetypal partnership codes. 
Rainer Maria Rilke saw a modern world ‘laced with often barely noticed material traces from the 
past that contained non-contemporaneous meaning and messages’
xix
. Although a present-day 
encounter with such objects may result in their appearing ungrounded or stranded because they 
are detached from their original surroundings, in fact this detachment does not “prevent them 
from continuing to signal backward to human worlds of meaning which would otherwise be lost 
from view”
xx
. This documentation of a past event informing the present gives a temporal depth to 
present partnerships arrangements, and to appreciate realities other than those of the immediate 
present. Documentation of this phenomenon provides a means of both deepening and broadening 
an understanding of the current manner in which these organisations construct and reconstruct 
themselves in an environment forty or fifty years removed from the original ‘significant event’. In 
the context of partnerships, the rule made sense, and continues to make sense, irrespective of why 
it started. The interview data were unexpected and there are no clear guidelines on dealing with 
such ‘surprises’. However, these diverse memories were able to be gathered to provide a 
contextual understanding of the meaning of partnerships and why anti-nepotism riles may have 
been introduced to reward merit, rather than birthright. 
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